

***Preference of Deference:
Conceptualizing a Reputable Citizenship***

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In the latter half of the twentieth century, citizenship is increasingly seen and used as a standard for social, political and civic recognition. Whether speaking of an individual or a group, citizenship plays an ever-increasing role as a form of legitimization in social and political affairs. Its significance lies in its modern ability, if not its purpose, to create a sense of inclusion, fitted with specific criteria that reflect one's moral and ethical nature based on culture. Ultimately, what citizenship intends to achieve, and what the good citizen aims to utilize in society, is humanity's need for respect expressed through a citizen's civil, political and social rights, and made manifest through social responsibility and civic duty.

In supposing citizenship as a standard for social, political, and civic recognition, it is necessary to briefly establish a philosophic and historical progression of the concept of citizenship. Aristotle remains influential in this respect, beginning with his premise that "man is a moral being with an intrinsic purpose, and that the proper objective of man is happiness, [and] this end [can] only be achieved through collective association" (Klusmeyer 13). Aristotle thus defines a citizen as a political entity "able and willing to rule and be ruled with a view to attaining a way of life according to goodness" (1283 b s.12, Barker 134). Aristotle's definition remains significant because it continues to provide a productive philosophic foundation to political and social order with the widely acceptable notion that man is a moral political animal.

Further historical development of citizenship goes on to refine the definition of the political animal. While Aristotle provides a philosophical foundation to citizenship, the Roman concept added to its development by creating a legal foundation. This foundation consisted of "a legal status that conferred different public and private rights and obligations in law" (Klusmeyer 20). This notion of citizenship differs from Aristotle's as it adds a distinctively materialistic element to the concept, moving "from the citizen as a political being to the citizen as a legal being, existing in a world of persons, actions, and things regulated by law" (Pocock 34). Citizenship gains a formal and possessive quality whereby its purpose was not exclusively one of direct political participation through discourse and lawmaking, but one where the citizen is "someone free to act by law, free to ask and expect the law's protection, [to be] a citizen of such and such a legal

community, of such and such a legal standing in that community" (36). Citizenship thus includes the basis for an inclusionary framework as, "the status of citizen now denotes membership in a community of shared or common law, which may or may not be identical to territorial community" (37).

A transformation takes place when the legal element is realized. Pocock notes that the transformation of citizenship from a political to legal form "brought about some equation of the 'citizen' with the 'subject' in defining him as a member of a community of law...[and thus] the subject of those laws" (38). This has the potential for individuals to "regard others as merely things to be used to [one's] own end" (43). To prevent this,

the jurists, and those political philosophers we have come to term 'liberals,' have proposed the solution of regarding the person as the bearer of what are called 'rights.' These are modes of interaction between the person and the world of things, and with other persons through the medium of things; person recognize one another as human, and so recognize themselves as human, through recognizing one another's rights in a universe of shared law (43).

The establishment of rights is a significant element in the development of citizenship as it forms the basis of conceptualizing citizenship to provide for an individual's social, political, and civic recognition, and ultimately respect, in society by providing the legal framework to establish, maintain and promote citizen interests.

While Aristotle's political philosophy and the pragmatic structure of Roman citizenship provide a significantly incomplete picture of the historic and philosophical development of citizenship in general, they do provide two key components to the argument—that of morality and legal rights. A citizen, by nature of being a part of a civil association will adhere to a particular moral framework. Parry refers to Oakeshott in defining a civil association as "a particular form of human conduct. Oakeshott has defined human conduct as free, intelligent agents 'disclosing themselves' in actions in pursuit of satisfactions whilst subscribing to 'a language of moral understanding and intercourse'" (Parry 169). Morality is important as it forms the fundamental framework within which individuals make their choices in social and political life,

the common thread...is to be found in the realm of values: solidarity and compassion for the fate and well-being of others, including unknown distant others; a sense of personal responsibility and reliance on one's own initiative to do the right thing; the impulse toward altruistic giving and sharing; the refusal of inequality, violence, and oppression. These are the compelling moral values that generate people's social energy and enhance the texture of civil society (de Oliveira and Tandon 3).

If citizens are willing to fully accept individuals into their association, then they would be willing to grant them the same privileges that existing members hold. In doing so, the association gives recognition of acceptance and all the related values.

Morality is put into practice in citizenship through the granting of particular rights. These rights include, "the civil element of citizenship...composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom...the political part of citizenship consist[ing] of the right to participate in the exercise of political power...[and] the social element of citizenship [which] is made up of a right to the prevailing standard of life and the social heritage of the society" (Barbalet 6). Without these rights used in conjunction with each other, the ability of citizenship to provide for a means of recognition is significantly limited. Heater argues that "citizenship is so ingrained now that social morality depends heavily upon the idea of civic duties, and social justice, on civic rights" (314). These rights, which can be defined as civil, political and social rights "invest the concept of citizenship with power" by providing a means to establish, maintain and develop ones "identity and virtue" (Heater 182).

Arguably, it is citizenship's inherent ability to provide a sense of identity that gives individuals and groups, the opportunity for civil, political and social recognition. Building on the Roman, legal definition of citizenship are characteristics such as culture and language that provide greater substance to the notion of the citizen,

the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the justice of its basic institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens: eg, their sense of identity, and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic or religious identities (Kymlicka 175).

Culture is important because the "capacity to form and revise a conception of the good is intimately tied to our membership in a societal culture, since the context of individual choice is the range of opinions passed down to us by our culture" (126). Kymlicka defines culture as "a 'societal culture'...which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres" (76). This societal culture is based on a shared language, with a "shared vocabulary [that] is the everyday vocabulary of social life, embodied in practices covering most areas of human activity. And in the modern world, for a culture to be embodied in social life means that it must be institutionally embodied—in schools, media, economic, government, etc" (76).

In the case of most modern countries, there exists a dominant societal culture that governs over minorities who exist either by conquest (colonization) or by choice (immigration). Arguably, these dominant societal cultures receive the highest social, political and civic recognition by forming a state within which to govern as citizens, and in doing so, gain the status, power, and right to allocate resources to fulfil their definition of 'the good.'

Thus, social, political and civic recognition consists of the ability to 'rule and be ruled' under a moral framework established through a societal culture and language, within a legal framework of citizenship. Citizenship is thus a "weighty, monumental, humanist word...[that] speak[s] of respect, of rights, of dignity. Consider the meaning and emotion

packed into the French *citoyen* of 1789, a word that condemned tyranny and social hierarchy, while affirming self-government and status equality" (Fraser and Gordon 90). The citizen is legitimated by the rights and privileges gained by pledging allegiance to a particular civil association, recognizing "certain rules which regulate their conduct within the jurisdiction in which they find themselves" (Parry 168). Through organization into a political state, political recognition is achieved as other states respect their political independence, and civil recognition is achieved through the establishment of specific rights protecting, if not nurturing their given identity. Social recognition is thus achieved through a shared identity and shared values that forge "a sense of solidarity and common purpose" (Kymlicka 189). With these forms of recognition, actions taken are both legitimized and given the required respect needed in the social, political and civic spheres.

The argument thus far has been relatively clear-cut in its approach, but what the argument is about to recognize is the fact that modern societies face the difficult task of providing recognition in the face of historical inequalities, racial prejudice, and social discrimination. Iris Marion Young notes this realization stating that "the assumed link between citizenship for everyone, on the one hand, and the two other senses of citizenship—having a common life with and being treated in the same way as other citizens—on the other, is itself a problem" (176). Indeed, Aristotle's definition of citizenship was a particular ideal that based its existence on the presence of a non-citizen class,

Aristotle draws, by implication, a distinction between those members of a polis who are 'integral parts' and actively share in its life, thus enjoying the status of *polites* or citizen, and those members of the polis who are 'necessary conditions' or *sine quibus non*, and whose share in its life is not that of active participation in its political activity, but only that of providing the material basis (of housing, food, commodities, and services) which is a condition of that activity (Barker 108).

In the modern state, certain individuals who have gained citizenship face the challenge of being civilly, socially and politically discriminated against because of a past injustice, or discrimination by, the dominant societal culture. Thus disadvantaged groups strive to challenge this 'necessary condition' by desiring certain forms of civil or political reparation with the aim of removing these prejudicial and discriminatory societal assumptions.

This brings up the question of whether citizenship, by definition, requires recognition for any culture at all. Arguably it does if citizenship is defined in the liberal tradition, stating that "whatever the social or group differences among citizens, whatever their inequalities of wealth, status, and power in everyday activities of civil society, citizenship gives everyone the same status as peers in the political public" (Young 175). Given historical prejudice and discrimination of particular groups, and the demands associated with liberal-democratic citizenship, "liberals should seek to ensure that there is equality

between groups, and freedom and equality *within* groups. Within these limits, minority rights can play a valuable role within a broader theory of liberal justice" (Kymlicka 194).

The challenge in achieving true universal citizenship among all citizens within a specific jurisdiction is determining the level of adjustment necessary to achieve equality among societal cultures and other disadvantaged groups. Indeed, Kymlicka notes that "protecting one person's cultural membership has costs for other people and other interests, and we need to determine when these trade-offs are justified" (107). However, what the dominant culture is responsible for is the promotion of "equality and cultural diversity within the mainstream culture" (127). For true equality to exist among citizens, "an adequate conception of citizenship, therefore, seems to require a balance of rights and responsibilities" (Kymlicka and Norman, 292). Both the 'giver' and 'receiver' of rights aimed at resolving historical injustices must work together in achieving true equality. That is, there must be a sense of fraternity binding people to "a common sense of purpose and are engaged in a common activity" producing "a respect for others with whom one collaborates" (Heater 186).

Ultimately, the goal of citizenship is to provide a source of respect based on the acceptance that each citizen has an equal opportunity to achieve their individual and collective goals within society. A key element is the realization that "inner-motivated power deriving from people's heartfelt agreement and approval is vital for success in any area of human endeavour. Peace itself is nothing more than a 'positive condition' that is sustained by the firm will of human beings" (Ikeda 4). If citizens are to achieve the recognition they desire, they must be willing to give the same opportunity to fellow citizens, "the good citizen is he who gives at least as much as he takes—both vertically to the state and horizontally to his fellows" (Heater 197). Citizens must realize that "people not only belong to separate political communities, but also belong in different ways. This means that the members of a polyethnic and multination state must not only respect diversity, but also respect a diversity of approaches to diversity" (Kymlicka 190). Citizens must realize that for every right gained, there is an equal social responsibility to maintain and protect the given right to fellow citizens. If citizens ignore this responsibility, they are simply causing inequality, gaining an individual right at the expense of another.

Thus, in a time where citizenship exists as a form of identity, rooted in cultural significance, fortified by a legal framework, for the purpose of social, political and civic recognition, citizens have the opportunity to achieve social respect and pursue what they deem, both individually and collectively, as the public good. Given the inequality among groups within the jurisdiction of a particular citizenship, citizens must be willing, in accordance with the culturally based morality legitimizing their rights, to act in the best interests of their fellow citizens by accepting the challenge of resolving the inequality in a constructive manner. Overall, if citizens accept their social responsibility and civic duty, in addition to their social, political, and civil rights granted by citizenship, then social, political and civil recognition and respect has the opportunity to be achieved. Thus, a reputable form a citizenship is achieved through the citizen's preference for respect and recognition of their identity.

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